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NOTES
WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY IN MONTANA CIVIL CASES
UNDER THE MONTANA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure,1 in effect since January 1, 1962,
present the following questions with respect to waiver of jury trials in dis-
trict court civil cases:
(1) Whether Rule 38(d), which provides that the right to a jury trial
is waived by failure to demand it, is consistent with the Montana
Constitution.
(2) Whether an amendment of a pleading, changing the action from
equity to law, revives the right to jury trial once waived under
Rule 38 (d).
(3) Whether Rule 39(c) gives the trial court discretion to call an
advisory jury in cases where the right of trial by jury has been
waived under Rule 38(d).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WAIVER OF JURY BY
FAILURE TO DEMAND IT
Under article III, section 23 of the Montana Constitution, a jury trial
in district court civil cases may be waived "upon default of appearance, or
by consent of the parties expressed in such manner as the law may pre-
scribe. "
Under Rule 38(d) of the Montana Rules, "the failure of a party to
serve a demand ... constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury."'
It can be seen that Rule 38(d) provides for automatic waiver of the
right unless a demand for a jury is made. The question is whether this
provision for waiver by failure to demand is consistent with the constitu-
tional provision, quoted above, that a jury may be waived by "consent."
Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Can one,
through inaction, be said to have expressed his consent to relinquish his
right of jury trial? The writer, for reasons hereinafter developed, believes
that the waiver provisions of Rule 38(d) are constitutional and should be
upheld. There are, however, constitutional issues peculiar to Montana that
pose serious questions concerning the validity of such waiver provisions.
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 93-2701-1 to 93-2711-7. Hereinafter, RrVIsED
CODES OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M., and the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
will be referred to as the Montana Rules.
'The waiver provisions of Rule 38(d) supersede the waiver statute under the former
code practice. That waiver statute, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5301, provides:
Trial by jury may be waived by the several parties to an issue of fact in actions
arising on contract, or for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with
or without damages, and with the assent of the court in other actions, in manner
following:
1. By failing to appear at the trial;
2. By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk;
3. By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes.
sMundt v. Mallon, 106 Mont. 242, 248, 76 P.2d 326 (1938).
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Federal Law
In the federal courts, where the federal constitution's seventh amend-
ment guarantees jury trial in civil cases, waiver by failure to demand
under Rule 38(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been uni-
formly upheld.' The provision of the Federal Rule, for waiver by failing
to demand, is identical to the Montana Rule.
With respect to jury trial, however, federal law does not control the
states. The seventh amendment guaranty of jury trial in civil cases is ap-
plicable only to federal courts. Morever, the fourteenth amendment guar-
anties of "due process" and "equal protection" do not restrict the control
of the individual states over jury trial in state courts. The federal con-
stitution does not limit the power of state governments to modify, alter, or
even abolish trial by jury.!
Thus, the constitutional question here presented is one of Montana
constitutional law only, and one on which the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court will be final.
Other States Generally
Most state constitutions make no specific provisions for waiver of jury
trial. Most have only broad provisions for preservation of the jury system.
For example, Iowa's constitution provides: "The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate."' In Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp,' plaintiff failed to
file written demand for a jury as required by the Iowa Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Plaintiff contended that the requirement for a demand was re-
pugnant to the Iowa Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the
waiver, however, saying:*
There seems no doubt of the proposition that the legislature
may make reasonable regulations as to the practice and procedure
in civil cases so long as the right to a jury trial is not materially
impaired. . . . It may provide that to entitle a party to a jury
trial he must make a demand therefor .... We think the reasonable
regulation or procedure prescribed by the rules does not abridge or
limit or modify the right which the constitution says shall remain
inviolate. It merely prescribes an orderly procedure by which the
litigant may exercise his right.
Other states, with similar constitutional provisions, have reached similar
conclusions.'
'See, e.g., Wilson v. Corning Glass Works, 195 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1952). Herein-
after, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be referred to as the Federal Rules.
'31 AM. Jun. Jury §§ 9 and 10.
'IOWA CoNST. art. I, § 9.
'237 Iowa 279, 21 N.W.2d 457 (1946).
81d. at 282,21 N.W.2d at 458.
'See, e.g., Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N.E.2d 508 (1943).
[Vol. 24,
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FOUR STATES WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
WAIVER SIMILAR TO THAT OF MONTANA
Washington
The Washington Constitution provides that "the legislature may pro-
vide . . . for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the
parties interested is given thereto. "'
In State ex rel. Clark v. Neterer," plaintiff failed to file a written de-
mand for a jury as required by statute. He contended that the statute was
repugnant to the constitutional requirement that waiver must be by "con-
sent . . . given," and that this meant an express giving of consent. The
Washington court, however, upheld the waiver, holding that the phrase
"consent . . . given" included both express consent and implied consent,
and that the constitution permitted the legislature to make a reasonable
definition of what would constitute the giving of implied consent.
In the Clark case, the Washington court took the position that the na-
ture of the constitutional right of jury trial was linked to the extent of
the right under the established law and practice of Washington Territory
at the time the state consitution was adopted. The territorial statute pro-
vided these three methods of waiver :1'
(1) By failing to appear at the trial.
(2) By written consent in person or by attorney, filed with the
clerk.
(3) By oral consent in open court entered in the minutes.
Subdivision (1) of this statute would permit waiver without the express
consent of the defaulting party. The court in the Clark case said :1'
We think it was not intended by the Constitution that there should
be any radical change in the established practice, but that the
words "consent... given" were used in their broadest sense. The
Legislature, therefore, may define what act shall constitute consent
given.
The Washington Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this position."
The three methods of waiver under Washington's territorial statute,
quoted above, are the same as those under both Montana's territorial statute
and Montana's now superseded state statute. Unless the difference in the
state constitutions is material, the Washington holding is persuasive author-
ity for sustaining Montana Rule 38(d).
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution provides that "provision may be made by
law ... for waiving of a jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties
interested is given thereto.'"'
10WAsH. CONsT. art. I, § 21. (Emphasis added.)
'33 Wash. 535,74 Pac. 668 (1903).
12 WASH. CODE4 1881, § 245.
'74 Pac. at 670.
"Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
"A~Rz. CoNsT. art. II, § 23. (Emphasis added.)
NOT'ES1962]
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In Jenkins v. Skelton," the court was concerned with a statute which
provided that failure to demand a jury would be regarded as a waiver. The
Arizona Supreme Court held this statute to be consistent with the constitu-
tional requirement of "consent .. .given." The court said :"?
The provisions ... [of the statute] concerning the waiving of trial
by jury, were in existence as paragraph 1389, Civil Code of 1901,
at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and the rules of
construction would require us to give to the expressions in the Con-
stitution about "waiver" the meaning contained in the territorial
statutes prior to statehood, as the Constitution only undertakes to
preserve the right of trial by jury as it existed at the time of its
adoption.
The Arizona constitutional language, "where the consent of the parties
interested is given thereto," is the same as Washington's. Although the
Arizona court came to the same result as the Washington court, the theory
was actually different. The Arizona court upheld the state waiver statute
because it was the same as the territorial statute. The Washington court
upheld the state waiver statute even though its provision for waiver by
failing to demand was completely unknown to the territorial practice. The
reasoning of the Arizona court is not applicable to Montana because Mon-
tana's territorial statute, like Washington's, had no provision for waiver
by failing to demand.
California
The California Constitution provides for waiver of jury trial in civil
actions "by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be
prescribed by law.'
In City of Los Angeles v. Zeller,' a special statute applicable to street
opening cases was considered. This statute required a demand for a jury.
The California Supreme Court ruled that the legislature could constitu-
tionally predicate "consent" for waiver on failure to make a demand.
In Bennett v. Hillman,' an ordinary action at law, California's general
waiver statute' was involved. The statute provided for waiver of a jury
by failing to make a demand. Defendant argued that the constitutional
requirement of consent, which will amount to a waiver, means express con-
sent and that it will not do for the legislature to predicate waiver upon a
failure of a party to demand a jury. The California district court of ap-
peal, however, held that the supreme court's reasoning in the Zeller case
required upholding the statute as "a proper exercise by the legislature of
the power to prescribe the manner in which the right of trial by jury may
be waived."' The California Supreme Court denied a rehearing of this
case.2
"21 Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249 (1920).
"192 Pac. at 252.
"CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7. (Emphasis added.)
"176 Cal. 194, 167 Pac. 849 (1917).
237 Cal. App. 586, 174 Pac. 362 (1918), rehearing denied by California Supreme
Court, 174 Pac. 362 (1918).
nCAi CoD Cirv. Paoc. § 631.
2174 Pac. at 363.
m174 Pac. 362 (1918).
[Vol. 24,
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In Glogau v. Hagan,' a California district court of appeal again up-
held the enforcement of waiver, saying :'
The Constitution vested the legislature with power to determine
such acts or omissions as shall deprive a litigant in a civil action
of a jury trial. This was done by enactment of the statute. Code
Civ. Proc. section 631....
In contrast to the civil cases discussed above, the California Supreme
Court has forbidden waiver of a jury in criminal cases except by consent
expressed in words,* because the state constitution provides that waiver
in criminal cases must be "by consent of both parties expressed in open
court by defendant and his counsel.'" from this it may appear that the
California courts have placed different construction on "consent . . . sig-
nified" than on "consent ... expressed," but this is not the result of the
California cases. These cases have simply recognized that "expressed in
open court by defendant and his counsel" leaves no room for waiver by
implication.
Idaho
The Idaho Constitution provides for waiver in civil cases "by the
consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by
law. r
Until 1958, Idaho's waiver statute was similar to Montana's section
93-5301, ' the waiver statute now superseded by Rule 38(d). In 1958, Idaho
adopted rules of civil procedure, and Idaho Rule 38(d) is the same as
Montana Rule 38(d). To date, the Idaho Supreme Court has not had oc-
casion to rule on whether failure to demand can be deemed a "consent" for
waiver. The Idaho constitutional provision, however, uses exactly the same
language as the California Constitution; for this reason, the Idaho court
may be expected to uphold the waiver provision of Idaho Rule 38(d).
MONTANA
Introduction
With ample authority from the federal courts and from sister states
sustaining waiver for failure to demand, it may seem inexorable that Mon-
tana should follow suit, and, it is submitted, Montana should do just that.
Admittedly, however, the prevailing view of other jurisdictions does not
necessarily apply in Montana because the constitutional provisions in the
other jurisdictions are not the same as Montana's. Article III, section 23
of the Montana Constitution provides for waiver "upon default of ap-
pearance, or by consent of the parties expressed in such manner as the law
may prescribe." (Emphasis added.) There are arguments for holding
that this renders invalid the provision for implied waiver as contained in
Rule 38 (d).
'107 Cal. App. 2d 313, 237 P.2d 329 (1951).
2237 P.2d at 332.
'People v. Holmes, 54 Cal. 2d 442, 353 P.2d 583 (1960).2
'GAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. (Emphasis added.)
I81DAHO CoNsT. art. I, § 7. (Emphasis added.)
'Supra note 2.
1962] NOTES
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First, the Montana Constitution specifically provides for one type of
implied waiver: i.e., upon default of appearance. Second, as to other
methods of waiver, the Montana Constitution uses the words "consent...
expressed" rather than ". . . given" or ". . . signified." Arguably, the
constitution meant to restrict implied waiver to defaults and to require
affirmative acts for any other waiver.
Certainly, Montana's constitutional provisions on waiver use language
different from those of other states. Whether the framers of the Montana
Constitution intended any different construction is the question. The
answer requires looking at the background-the practice in Montana at
the time the constitution was adopted.
Waiver under Montana territorial practice
The fundamental law of the Montana territory was the federal con-
stitution, and the right of jury trial in civil cases was governed by the
seventh amendment:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
court of the United States than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.
Federal law made no provision for waiver, but a Montana territorial statute
provided for waiver in three ways:'
(1) By failing to appear at the trial.
(2) By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the
clerk.
(3) By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes.
These are the same methods as conatined in the now superseded state
statute, section 9 3 -5 3 0 1 ,' and none involve waiver by failing to demand as
provided by Montana Rule 38 (d).
Montana Constitution
When the Montana constitutional convention met in 1889, the terri-
torial statute controlled the practice on waiver of jury trial. This fact is
important in determining the meaning of the constitutional provision be-
cause, as the Montana Supreme Court has often said, the territorial prac-
tice may be looked to for determining the meaning of the constitution.'
At the constitutional convention, William Wirt Dixon, a delegate from
Silver Bow County, and a lawyer, proposed what became article III, section
23." Although the convention debated parts of his proposed section, the
sComp. Stat. of Mont., 15th Session, First Div. ch. VII § 279 (1887).
Osupra note 2.
'See, e.g., Bull v. Butte Elec. Ry., 69 Mont. 529, 532, 223 Pac. 514 (1924).
'PROCEEDINGS AND DEmATES OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 125"
(1889). On July 18, 1889, the convention had resolved itself into the "Committee
of the Whole" to debate the proposed bill of rights. Siapra at 107. During these
proceedings, the following section, prepared by the convention's Judiciary Commit-
tee, was submitted to the delegates:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In criminal cases, but a Jury In
[Vol. 24,
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NOTES
waiver provisions were not even discussed. The official report of the con-
vention's proceedings does not disclose what Mr. Dixon may have had in
mind when he proposed that a jury could be waived "upon default of ap-
pearance, or by consent of the patries expressed in such manner as the law
may prescribe." He may have had a reason for using that particular lan-
guage, but he did not explain his reasons to the convention and no inquiry
was made of him.
Montana cases
The Montana Supreme Court has often considered the constitutional
right of jury trial, though the court has never had presented to it the con-
stitutionality of a waiver provision such as contained in Rule 38(d).
One of the early cases was State ex rel. Jackson v. Kennie." In a jus-
tice's court porceeding, relator had been jailed for failure to post bond to
keep the peace. He contended that the proceeding was unconstitutional in
not providing him with a jury trial. The supreme court disagreed, point-
ing out that this proceeding was one for the prevention, rather than pun-
ishment, of crime; that the rules of constitutional construction require
construing the constitution in view of the conditions existing at the time
of its adoption; that the right of trial by jury guaranteed under the con-
stitution was "the right as it then existed, and not one created or extended,
except by express terms, by the instrument itself" ;' and that when the
constitution was adopted in 1889, the right of trial by jury did not exist
under the territorial statutes for the prevention of public offenses. Since
the territorial statutes did not grant a jury in that kind of case no constitu-
tional right to a jury exists. The result of this case is that there is no
constitutional right to a jury except in cases where the right was recog-
nized under territorial practice.'
In Montana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Boston & Montana Consolidated
Copper & Silver Mining Co.,' the court upheld the denial of a jury in a
quiet title action. This was a suit in equity, and since juries were not claim-
able in suits in equity under the territorial practice, there is no right to a
jury under the constitution.
Chessman v. Male' was an action for damages for a private nuisance,
and for an injunction. At the trial, the judge announced that he would
treat the whole case as one in equity; neither party objected. On appeal,
however, plaintiff contended that the trial court had improperly failed to
submit to a jury questions on existence of the nuisance and on damages.
civil cases in all courts or in criminal courts not of the grade of felony, may con-
sist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.
Then, Mr. Dixon announced that he had a substitute for this section which he
desired to offer. His substitute, so far as waiver is concerned, was worded exactly
as article III, section 23 is now.
"824 Mont. 45, 60 Pac. 589 (1900).
'r24 Mont. at 56, 60 Pac. at 593.
'*But new statutory remedies, though unknown to the territorial practice, may be
classed as actions at law and thus include a constitutional right to a jury. Solberg
v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 70 Mont. 177, 225 Pac. 612 (1924) (statutory action to
compel the release of an oil and gas lease of record and for damages held to be an
action at law).
3727 Mont. 288, 70 Pac. 1114 (1902).
031 Mont. 577, 79 Pac. 254 (1905).
19621
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The supreme court sustained this contention, holding that plaintiff's silence
could not be construed as waiving a jury. The court, speaking through
Mr. Commissioner Poorman, said :'
This provision of the Constitution that a jury may be waived in the
manner prescribed by the law-that is, by written law-is man-
datory and prohibitory. (Section 29, Article III.)' It is the duty
of the court to grant to litigants the rights given them by this con-
stitutional provision. The Constitution, in effect, commands that
a jury trial, if waived, shall be waived in a certain manner, and
prohibits its being waived in any other manner. The only manner
prescribed by law for waiving a jury to a civil action is found in
Section 1110, Code of Civil Procedure [of 1895]" . . . .
The plaintiff was under no obligation to demand a trial by
jury, for that right was given him by the Constitution; nor was he
required to submit to the court the question as to whether he had
a right to a jury trial, for that right was also granted to him by
the Constitution. ... The right of trial by jury may be waived only
in the manner provided by law. It cannot be taken away.
Commissioner Poorman here uses strong language that a litigant is not
required to demand a jury, "for that right was given him by the Con-
stitution." Nevertheless, this case is not authority for holding unconstitu-
tional the waiver provisions of Rule 38(d). All the Chessman case said
was that the constitutional provision, "consent of the parties expressed
in such manner as the law may prescribe," made the statutory methods
exclusive, and forbade waiver in any manner other than those prescribed
by statute. The Chessman case did not say that the waiver statute in ex-
istence when the constitution was adopted was fixed for all time and that
the legislature was powerless to adopt other methods of waiver. The re-
sult of Chessman, then, is to forbid non-statutory methods of waiver; it
does not forbid implied waiver when a statute specifically provides for
such waiver.
Chief Justice Brantly dissented in the Chessman case." He disagreed
with Commissioner Poorman's opinion that a jury could be waived only
by observance of the formalities prescribed by statute. The Chief Justice
thought that in this case the plaintiff, in not objecting at the trial, was
estopped to say he was denied his constitutional right to a jury. Interest-
ingly, fifteen years later, in Blackfoot Land Development Co. v. Burks,"
Commissioner Poorman had occasion to say:"
We may remark, however, that neither in the case of Chessman v.
Hale . . . ,nor in any other case, has this court ever held that a
party may not by his course of conduct bar himself from the right
of raising the question that he was not granted a trial by jury in
a civil action.
O'Id. at 590-91, 79 Pac. at 258.
"OMONT. CONST. art. III, § 29 reads: "The provisions of this constitution are man-
datory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise."
"Section 1110 of the 1895 Code of Civil Procedure is the same as R.C.M. 1947,
§ 93-5301, supra note 2, the statute now superseded by Rule 38(d).
'31 Mont. at 593, 79 Pac. at 259.
860 Mont. 544,199 Pac. 685 (1921).
"Id. at 552, 199 Pac. at 687-88.
[Vol. 24,
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Perhaps Commissioner Poorman was attempting to mitigate the force of his
own opinion in the Chessman case.
From the Montana cases discussed above, and from others,' it is clear
that the Montana court has never had before it the question of the con-
stitutionality of a general statute, applicable to actions at law, providing
for waiver of a jury for failure to demand it. The court has always as-
sumed, however, that article III, section 23 of the constitution did not
change the basic, constitutional right of jury trial as it was known under
territorial practice. Further, the court has never held that article III,
section 23 rendered the territorial methods of waiver unchangeable.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the Montana constitutional provisions for waiver
do not prohibit waiver by failure to demand, as provided for by Rule 38 (d).
We have no reason to attach peculiar significance to the wording of
article III, section 23. The language was not the result of either commit-
tee study or convention debate. We have no reason, therefore, to think
that the framers of the Montana Constitution intended to restrict the meth-
ods of waiver to the precise ones known to the territorial practice."
The Montana cases purporting to construe the waiver provisions of
article III, section 23 cannot be cited as authority that the waiver provisions
of Rule 38(d) are unconstitutional, because no case has ever drawn into
question the constitutionality of the statutory methods of waiver applicable
to actions at law.
The reasoning behind the federal and sister state decisions should be
persuasive in upholding the waiver provisions of Rule 38(d). Even with
waiver for failure to demand, the right of jury trial is still preserved in
its basic elements. The purpose of waiver for failure to demand is not to
trick a litigant into overlooking his right to a jury; the purpose is to
further judicial administration by settling the mode of trial, jury or non-
jury, well in advance of trial. This is particularly important in a system
of fused law and equity where legal claims for relief may be joined with
equitable claims and where legal defenses may be joined with equitable
defenses and where, in one litigation, several parties may present many
different claims and defenses, some legal and some equitable. In our mod-
ern system, to uphold the requirement of affirmative demand for a jury
is to strengthen our judicial system.
'See, e.g., Consolidated Gold & Sapphire Mining Co. v. Struthers, 41 Mont. 565, 111
Pac. 152 (1910) (power of trial court to direct a verdict is same as under terri-
torial practice) ; In re McLure's Estate, 68 Mont. 556, 220 Pac. 527 (1923) (statute,
requiring demand for jury in probate matters, is constitutional because there wan
no right to a jury in probate proceedings under the territorial practice) ; Applica-
tion of Banschbach, 133 Mont. 312, 323 P.2d 1112 (1958) (supreme court assumed,
without deciding, that a demand for a jury was necessary in juvenile proceedings).
eThe framers actually made some drastic changes in the right of jury trial. Undf.r
territorial practice, juries had to be composed of 12 jurors, and verdicts had to be
unanimous. This was the practice in all civil cases and all criminal cases. Under
the Montana Constitution, article III, section 23, justice court juries consist of not
more than six jurors; the parties to all civil cases and to criminal misdemeanor
cases may agree to a jury of less than 12; and in all civil cases and in criminal
misdemeanor cases, two-thirds in number of the jury may render a verdict. These
changes were the subject of lengthy debate by the convention. See PROCEDNS AND
DEnATEs OF THE MONTANA CoNSTTruIoNAL CoNVENTioN 264 (1889).
19621 NOTES
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Finally, as a basic rule of statutory construction, courts strive to save
the constitutionality of a statute. A statute is prima facie presumed to be
constitutional, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of its validity.
The invalidity of a statute must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt before
the court will declare it unconstitutional. And a statute will not be held
unconstitutional unless its violation of the fundamental law is clear and
palpable. 7 The waiver provisions of Rule 38(d) are, therefore, presump-
tively valid; the Montana court should sustain these provisions unless they
are clearly repugnant to the constitution.
THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS ON WAIVER
Montana Rule 38(d), in addition to making failure to demand a jury
a waiver, provides:
A waiver of trial by jury is not revoked by an amendment of a
pleading asserting only a claim or defense arising out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading.
In May 1954, this sentence was proposed by the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee for inclusion in Federal Rule 38(d), ' but it was never incorporated
in the Federal Rule. By this sentence, the Committee meant to make clear
that where the basic facts are the same, the amendment of a pleading mere-
ly changing the legal theory will not revive a right of trial by jury once
waived." The Committee meant the provision to apply not only where the
pleader amends a pleading in an action at law without changing the legal
nature of the issue, but also where the pleader changes his legal theory
from "equity" to "law."°
Constitutional issue
Under the Montana Constitution, a jury may be waived by "consent
of the parties expressed in such manner as the law may prescribe. "' Where
an action as originally pleaded is exclusively equitable, no jury is claimable
of right by either plaintiff or defendant. Therefore, in suits exclusively
equitable, even the pleader who wants a jury may omit demanding one be-
cause he knows he has no right to a jury. In such a case, however, suppose
the pleadings are later amended to present legal issues, i.e., issues to which
the constitutional right of jury trial applies. Arguably, either party then
has a constitutional right to a jury by making seasonable demand after the
"See State ex rel. City of Mlssoula v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 273-74, 47 P.2d 624
(1935) (citing many cases).
"PRELIMINARY DRtAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 39-40 (May 1954). The text of the
Committee note is quoted in 2B BARRON & HOLT0oFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
conum 36 n.52.1 (Rules ed., Wright rev. 1961).
"Diversity of views had developed in the Federal courts. See the Committee's note
in the Preliminary Draft referred to supra note 48, citing, inter alia, Bereslavsky
v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, Caffey v. Bereslavsky, 332
U.S. 770, granting a jury demand after amendment of a pleading; and Gulbenkian
v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945), refusing a jury demand after amend-
ment of a pleading.
0"Mason, The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 MONT. L. REv. 1, 53 (1961).
OMONT. CONsT. art. III, §23.
[Vol. 24,
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pleading is amended. Nevertheless, under the second sentence of Montana
Rule 38 (d), quoted above, no such right exists."
How, under the constitution, can a party be said to have expressed
his "consent" to waive a jury before he has actually had a right to a jury
trial? As discussed earlier in this Note, waiver of the right to a jury trial
by failure to demand it should be held constitutional in Montana. But to
say that one has expressed his consent to waive a jury in situations where
he has never had a right to a jury may be stretching too far the constitu-
tional requirement of consent for waiver.
Professor Mason has suggested, however, that notice of a potential
claim for relief may be said to afford a basis for choice, and such notice
may be said to result from a statement of the "conduct, transaction, or
occurrence" in the pleading, regardless of the relief demanded.' Certain-
ly, it must be remembered that the non-revocation of waiver provision in
Rule 38(d) applies only where the pleading amendment asserts a claim or
defense arising out of the facts as originally pleaded; the provision is not
applicable where the pleading amendment sets forth facts different from
those originally pleaded. Therefore, in every case where the non-revoca-
tion of waiver provision applies, the parties have been "put on guard,"
so to speak, by a statement of the facts in the original pleading.
The non-amending party
A more serious question of constitutionality may arise when the pro-
vision for non-revocation of waiver is applied against the non-amending
party than when applied against the amending party. In terms, the non-
revocation provision of Rule 38(d) applies to both.
The difference is this. It may be reasonable to impose non-revoca-
tion of waiver on one who, having originally pleaded certain facts and
based his claim or defense on them, later amends to introduce new issues
based on the same facts. Having originally set forth those facts to support
his position, he has had reasonable notice of what issues, legal or equitable,
they may present.
It does not follow, though, that the non-amending party, who has done
nothing to change the nature of the issues, can reasonably have non-revoca-
tion of waiver imposed on him. He may have no information about the
facts pleaded by his opponent and may have assumed from his opponent's
,original claim or defense that no jury issues were present and that none
would arise. In this event, it cannot be said that the non-amending party
has had notice of a potential claim for relief merely because his opponent
has had such notice.
One thing is certain, however. Until the supreme court has ruled on
the constitutional problems in Rule 38(d), the careful practitioner will
demand a jury in a/ cases in which he wants a jury, whether or not at that
time a jury is claimable of right. Where a general and timely demand for
a jury has once been made, no new demand for a jury is necessary even
"lBy the Rule's own terms, however, the right would exist if the claim or defense
presented by the amended pleading arose out of facts different from those originally
pleaded.
' Mason, supra note 50, at 54.
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though the pleading amendment raises new issues, because a general demand
embraces all issues in an action that are triable to a jury."
USE OF AN ADVISORY JURY WHERE JURY TRIAL
OF RIGHT HAS BEEN WAIVED
The lontana Rules make provision for relief from waiver of jury
trial and also give the trial court the power to call advisory juries. Mon-
tana Rule 39(b) provides:
Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall
be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party
to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have
been made of right, the court upon motion or of its own initiative
may on ten days' notice to the parties order a trial by a jury of
any or all issues.'
Montana Rule 39(c) provides:
In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion
or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or,
the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a
jury whose verdi'ct has the same effect as if trial by jury had
been a matter of right.'
Suppose in an action at law, where a jury is claimable of right, the
parties waive their right to a jury by not making timely demand. May
the court then call an advisory jury under Rule 39(c) ? Or is Rule 39(c)
inapplicable to actions at law where the right to a jury has been waived?
If the court may call an advisory jury, may the court, under the last
clause of Rule 39(c), make the jury verdict conclusive and not merely ad-
visory?
Rule 39(c), in referring to actions "not triable of right by a jury," is
referring literally to equitable actions; these are the cases in which, tradi-
tionally, a jury is not claimable of right. But in a law action-where juries
are claimable of right-if a party has, under Rule 38(d), waived his right
to a jury by not demanding it, the action then becomes, at least in a sense,
an action "not triable of right by a jury." In such a situation, the con-
stitutional and statutory right to a jury has been waived nd all the litigant
has is the possibility of getting a jury under Rule 39(b) or Rule 39 (c), in
either case pursuant only to the judge's discretion and not of right.
"5 Moom, FEDERAL PpAcrIE 38.41, at 325-26 (2d ed. 1951).
"
T he last clause, "upon motion or of its own initiative may on ten days' notice to the
parties order a trial by a jury of any or all issues" has been substituted for the
clause of the Federal Rule, "in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by
jury of any or all issues." According to the Montana Civil Rules Commission, this
change was made to remove any doubt as to the court's power to call a jury in its
own discretion, whether or not a motion has been made, and at the same time pro-
vide the parties with advance notice that there will be a jury trial despite waiver.
See Commission Note to Proposed Rule 39, MONTANA RULEs OF CrviiL PROCEDuuR 71(West Pub. Co. 1961).
6This subdivision is identical with the Federal Rule, except for the omission of the
clause, "except in actions against the United States when a statute of the United
States provides for trial without a jury."
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In all respects material to the present discussion, Federal Rule 39 (c) is
the same as Montana Rule 39(c).' The federal cases have disagreed on
whether the court may, under May 39(c), call an advisory jury after the
parties to an action at law have waived their right to a jury.
In (American) Lumbermers Mutual Casitalty Co. of Illinois v. Timms
& Howard, Inc.,' the court of appeals upheld the trial court's calling an
advisory jury after the parties had waived their right to a jury, saying:'
... there seems no reason why the parties, with the approval of
the judge, should not agree that an advisory verdict be taken as
in equity and with the same weight as such a verdict had in equity.
In Hargrove v. American Central Isnurance Co.," the parties had
waived their right to a jury. The court, with the acquiescence of both
parties, called a jury whose verdict was to be given only the weight of an
advisory jury in equity. The court of appeals disapproved of this pro-
cedure, saying :'
... The issues tendered were basically legal in their nature, and
the case was triable as of right by jury .... It follows that the court
was not authorized of its own initiative to call a jury in an ad-
visory capacity, when a jury was waived in the absence of a motion
by one of the party litigants.
The trial court was not reversed for calling the advisory jury, however,
because the trial court had, in fact, wholly disregarded the verdict of the
jury and had made its independent findings and conclusions on which it
based its judgment.' The court of appeals, in disapproving but not re-
versing, took the position that not only had the parties consented to calling
the advisory jury, but also they were not prejudiced, because the trial court
had actually disregarded the jury's findings.
Professor Moore agrees with the (American) Lumbermens case, up-
holding the use of advisory juries in jury-waived cases:'
If there is any merit for the trial court's use of a jury in an ad-
visory capacity for the trial of equitable issues . . . , there must be
similar merit in using the advisory jury for the trial of legal is-
sues, where there was a constitutional or statutory right but the
parties have waived it. In fact it is on the last type of issue, rather
than on the equitable issue, that a jury is likely to be most helpful.
The reasoning of the Hargrove case was that, if the parties want a court
trial, the court should not be permitted to impose a jury trial on them.
But Moore criticizes the Hargrove rationale on this point. The trial court
would not be imposing on the parties a common law jury, i.e., canclusive
"'See supra note 56.
'108 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939).W4Id. at 500.
0125 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1942).
'Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
05 Mwoo&, FEIDRAL PRACTwE 39.10, at 722 (2d ed. 1951).
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jury trial. An advisory jury is called only to "enlighten th court's con-
science," and the judge must make his own findings of fact.
Professor Wright likewise feels that the more reasonable view is to
allow the court full discretion regardless of a waiver by the parties. The
responsibility for finding the facts still rests with the judge, but if he wishes
the help of an advisory jury, there is no reason why the parties, by waiving
jury trial, should be permitted to deny him such help.'
The reasoning of Moore and Wright is persuasive. In Montana, there
is another reason for permitting the trial court to call an advisory jury in
jury-waived cases. Under Montana Rule 39(b), the trial court has the
power of its own initiative to order a conclusive trial by jury, even in jury-
waived cases. Federal Rule 39(b) permits the court to call a jury in
waiver cases only upon motion of one of the parties." Since a Montana trial
court has the power under Rule 39(b) to call a common law jury whose
verdict will be conclusive, there is no reason to deny the court the power
under Rule 39(c) to call an advisory jury to "enlighten the court's con-
science." The parties could not complain, as the Hargrove case said they
might, that the court had imposed a jury on them despite their intentional
waiver. The reasoning of the Hargrove case, therefore, simply does not
apply in Montana where the Rule itself gives the court the power to im-
pose a jury on the parties despite their wish for a court trial.
JAMES W. THOMPSON
'Vosburg Co. v. Watts, 221 Fed. 402, 408 (4th Cir. 1915), cited by (American) Lum-
bermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d at 500.
' 2B BAIRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 891, at 64 (Rules ed.,
Wright rev. 1961).
"See supra note 55.
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